Army with the M3 Enigma machine after September 15, 1938 
Introduction
The military Enigma machine was a portable electro-mechanical rotor encrypting machine used during the Second World War, mainly by the German military and government services. Beginning in 1932, Polish cryptologists (M. Rejewski, J. Różyc-ki, and H. Zygalski) systematically worked on decoding ciphers, constantly modified manners of generating secret messages, and modernized the construction of Enigma machines.
The algorithms presented below can be used to decode messages transmitted after September 15, 1938 . That day, the German service withdrew initial drum settings from tables of daily key settings and changed the manner of announcing message settings.
The proposed plugboard algorithm is the authors' idea. The cryptologists could not guess the connections of the plugboard with this method within 20 minutes with the use of the technology of that time. They used various tricks that relied on knowledge of the German language. The presented algorithm does not depend on any language.
The second algorithm is a reconstruction of Rejewski's bomb. This algorithm was assembled on the basis of information which had been found in the literature (mainly historical sources). Historians often make factual mistakes; therefore, ambiguouslydescribed facts were completed with the authors' observations. To get the total algorithm, we tested different possibilities and chose the ones which provided the proper result.
The German service used different kinds of Enigma machines (also commercial), modified their construction, and changed the manner of generating secret messages. However, we are only interested in the M3 Enigma machine. For the reader's convenience, we described the construction, the parameters of this machine, and the manner of generating messages transmitted after September 15, 1938 in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we described the work of Polish cryptologists. These sections make up a brief survey of well-known information taken from publications [8, 23, 9, 7, 10, 2, 5, 16] . We suggest reading Appendix A in the beginning to better understand the terms and facts that we use. These terms are denoted in this paper by *. In sections 3 and 5, we provide some mathematical facts concerning permutations and, in particular, 1-cycles (which are essential to understand the presented methods). In section 4, the reader can find a mathematical analysis of the M3 Enigma machine. Section 6 contains a description and justification of the plugboard algorithm (the authors' idea). In section 7, we provide a reconstruction of the bomb method. By means of these two algorithms, we can generate a complete daily key settings
Ciphers
We can find the first ciphers in antiquity. Then, among other things, steganography was used. That is, secret information was concealed by means of different techniques; for example, secret text was hidden in an unimportant text. In Egypt and China, invisible ink was used. We also know the Caesar cipher and scytale method. Later, the following groups of classical ciphers were used: transposition ciphers, substitution ciphers (monoalphabetic (e.g., the affine cipher), homophonic and polyalphabetic (e.g., the Hill cipher, the Vigenere cipher)).
In the early 19th century, electro-mechanic devices were designed for encrypting messages, and cryptologists made use of the telegraph and radio. The World Wars brought about an abundance of ciphering machines, the most noted being: Enigma (German rotor machine), Purple (Japanese machine), the German Lorenz machine, American SIGABA, and British Typex. These machines were designed to protect military and diplomatic information, but similar devices were used in commerce.
The development of digital computers provided cipher designers with great computational power. The effect of this transition into the digital domain was the rise of binary ciphering algorithms. On the other hand, common access to cheap electronic devices forced cipher designers to create safer products. Ciphers used in contemporary cryptographic systems should remain secure even if the adversary possesses full knowledge of the ciphering algorithm. That is, security of the key used should be sufficient to maintain confidentiality of communication when under attack (Kerckhoffs's principle). A cryptologic algorithm becomes threatened when an exhaustive attack on a key becomes possible as a result of progress in computing technology. Conditionally-secure ciphers are not very sensitive to the increment of computing power of the attacker. To prevent an effective attack, designers add larger security parameters.
Regarding the type of key, we distinguish two classes of ciphering algorithms: symmetric-key algorithms and public-key (asymmetric-key) algorithms. In symmetrickey algorithms, both the sender and receiver share the same key (sometimes their keys are different but related in an easily-computable way). Asymmetric-key algorithms use a pair of different keys: a public one is used to encrypt and a private one to decrypt. The two keys are mathematically related in such a way that there is no effective method of finding the private key on the basis of the public one. Recently, the following symmetric-key algorithms played a major role: DES (Data Encryption Standard), 3DES, CDMF (Commercial Data Masking Facility), IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm), the Rijndael algorithm, Standard AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), RC2, RC4, RC5, RC6, and Blowfish. Some of the important asymmetric-key algorithms include: RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman) and the ElGamal algorithm.
In order to protect a cryptosystem from an exhaustive attack (by means of current computing power), cipher designers combine different methods and technologies. They apply substitution boxes (S-boxes), permutation boxes (P-boxes), and substitution-permutation networks, which carry out encryption in multiple rounds (DES, 3DES, and FEAL). Other means involve a Feistel network, different functions (e.g., one-way functions), bit operations, dividing data into blocks, and combining them with pseudorandom character streams. Other important factors include keystrength analysis, or the use of intractable mathematical problems: the integer factorization problem (RSA), the discrete logarithm problem (ElGamal, RSA), and the knapsack problem (Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem). Cryptologists also make use of cyclic groups and elliptic curves which are currently widely studied (RSA, ElGamal). (cf. [21, 25, 13, 4, 15, 28]) 
Elements of permutation theory
For the reader's convenience, we provide some definitions and facts from permutation theory (cf. [18, 20, 24] ). A permutation of an n-element set X = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a map σ : X → X of X into itself such that if i, j ∈ X and i = j then σ(i) = σ(j). The set of permutations of X we denote by Sn. We shall represent any permutation σ ∈ Sn
The inverse of a permutation σ (denoted by σ
) is defined as the map σ
We shall form a product (a composition) of two permutations f, g ∈ Sn in the same way as M. Rejewski in [23] i.e.,
; e.g.,
This notation is different from standard notation, but it is used by authors interested in the Enigma machine. We usually omit the circle •, and write f g for the composite map. The composition of permutations is associative.
For any permutation σ, we have σ −1 σ = id X and σσ
= id X , where id X is the identity permutation, that is, the permutation such that id X (i) = i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. A permutation σ ∈ Sn is called a cycle of length k or k-cycle if there are k elements a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k of the domain X = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that σ(a 1 ) = a 2 , σ(a 2 ) = a 3 , . . . , σ(a k−1 ) = a k , σ(a k ) = a 1 and for the remaining elements of X we have σ(a i ) = a i . A more compact way of writing a k-cycle is σ = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ). It is understood that σ maps each a i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 into the element listed on its immediate right, a k into a 1 , and each unlisted integer of X into itself. A cycle of length two is called a transposition.
Mathematical analysis
Let P = {A, B, . . . , Z} be a set of possible plaintexts, and let C = P be a set of possible ciphertexts. The M3 Enigma machine ciphers text T by using a poly-alphabetic substitution cipher. Each letter a ∈ P of the message is transformed according to the following permutation (cf. [23] ) 
1-cycles
Let us assume that we eavesdropped four messages on the same day with the following headlines * . This means that these messages were generated for the same daily key settings * .
(1) XFI ADR AXF (2) TWP HNP LNR (3) ADM DOD YKD (4) ZHO IEF YEM The first 3 letters of each message make up the initial drum settings * . The Enigma codes the next 6 letters of a message (meant as double coded message settings * ) using the following permutations (cf. [23] ).
We can obtain permutations A, B,. . . , F in the following way. We set up our Enigma machine in the same way as the coder had set his machine up during ciphering.
Next, we type all of the letters of the alphabet in order without using the turning mechanism * (cf. [10] ). In the case of the message (1), we receive
Permutations A, D consist of 13 transpositions. On the basis of double-ciphered message settings ADR AXF, we can notice that A as well as D permutations contain a transposition (x, A), where x is a ciphered letter (different from A). In the case of the message (1) , that is the transposition (A, Q). Therefore, the product AD assigns the letter A to the letter A and the letter Q to the letter Q. Thus, there are 1-cycles in the permutation AD. Below, we write down the permutation AD as a product of disjoint cycles
We can see that the first letter of the message settings was the letter Q. We proceed in the same way when identical letters are located in positions two and five (or three and six) in double-ciphered message settings, because it means that a permutation BE (or CF ) contains 1-cycles (cf. [8] ).
Plugboard algorithm (the authors' idea)
The Zygalski's sheets method and the cryptologic bomb were used to generate the daily key settings after September 15, 1938 . Neither of these methods give plugboard settings. It is a well-known fact that the plugboard connections do not have any influence on the work of both of these methods. This means that, with these methods, we can obtain the first 3 elements of the daily key settings regardless of how the coder set his plugboard up during ciphering.
The presented plugboard algorithm can be used for cryptanalysis together with both Zygalski's method and the bomb method. We used the fact that identical letters in positions one and four (or two and five or three and six) in double-ciphered message settings mean that a permutation AD (or BE or CF ) contains 1-cycles.
We received the following results for real connections of both drums and plugboard that were used by Wehrmacht. We assume (according to the knowledge of that time) that we know connections of all kinds of drums. Given examples were executed for drums: L = I, M = II, R = III, for the reflector B = UKW B and for the plugboard connections S = (ET)(IX)(MQ)(NV)(PU)(YZ). Let us fix, that we shall treat the letters A, B,. . . , Z of the Latin alphabet as the numbers from the set IP = {0, 1, . . . , 25}.
The output contacts of cipher drums I, II, and III (cf. [8] ):
The turnover positions for selected drums: I -Q, II -E, III -V (cf. [8] ). The reflector connections (cf. [8] ):
UKW B : (AY) (BR) (CU) (DH) (EQ) (FS) (GL) (IP) (JX) (KN) (MO) (TZ) (VW)
Below, we present two protocols of a cryptologist's work. (A) when the algorithm returns all daily key settings (with connections of plugboard), and (B) when the algorithm gives daily key settings without plug connections (the cryptologist receives a permutation S, which represents a plugboard in another way and he sets up a plugboard himself). For greater clarity, we shall notice that S = S • Cryptologist sets up his machine (all parameters without message settings).
• He sets the drums to EFE.
• He types the text HDBRYU and the program returns message settings IOP(IOP).
• He sets the drums to IOP.
• He types the text DCVEOYBEPVSHFLXGZJ and the program returns a result PLUGBOARDALGORITHM. A protocol (B) -the algorithm gives daily key settings without plug connections (cryptologist receives plug connections S = (ET) (IX) (MQ) (NV) (PU) (YZ) in another way).
• Cryptologist sets up his machine (all parameters without message settings and plugboard settings).
• He reconstructs message settings.
• He changes manually the text HDBRYU to HDBRZP (according to a permutation S).
• He types the text HDBRZP and the program returns message settings XOU(XOU).
• He changes manually the text XOUXOU to IOPIOP (according to S). IOP makes up message settings.
• He decodes the ciphered text.
• He changes manually the text DCVEOYBEPVSHFLXGZJ to DCNTOZBTUNSHFLIGYJ.
• He types DCNTOZBTUNSHFLIGYJ and the program returns ULPGBOARDALGORXEHQ.
• He changes manually the text ULPGBOARDALGORXEHQ to PLUGBOARDALGORITHM.
Schema of the plugboard algorithm
We denote by (X )) that are received for the same daily key settings only make up an input to the plugboard algorithm.
Example 6.2
We shall use the set of messages from the table 1 to determine plugboard settings.
Schema of the plugboard algorithm 1. Set up your machine according to the daily key settings without plugboard connections (i.e., plug connections are represented by the identity permutation H) 2. Add messages to the vector M (compare the example 6.2). 3. Split messages into two vectors V1 and V2.
• Add to the vector V2 couples of messages of the form (X 14 ) with the same recurrent letter k; e.g., messages (6) XFP EAZ EEQ and (7) DMA EFP EMR. Each two messages are represented in V2 by means of one object of the 1cycle class which contains three fields (c -a recurrent letter, s1 -a string with 1-cycles of a permutation A 1H D 1H for the first message and s2 -1-cycles of a permutation A 2H D 2H for the second message). We draw the reader's attention to the fact that a permutation can contain several 1-cycles. For messages (6) and (7), the program creates the object [c=E, s1=GT, s2=DEFMNSTY].
• Add to the vector V1 the remaining messages; i.e., these messages for which we cannot find another message with the same letter in positions one and four in double-ciphered message settings (e.g., the message (1) ICE AJA ADV). Each message in V1 is represented by one object of the 1cycle class which contains two fields (c -a recurrent letter and s1 -a string with 1-cycles of a permutation A 1H D 1H for the analyzed message). For message (1) , the program generates the object [c=A, s1=AY]. 4. An analysis of the vector V2
• The program analyzes objects of the vector V2 and reconstructs a permutation S. The permutation S transforms a recurrent letter c into a letter of the alphabet which occurs in both strings s1 and s2. For messages (6) and (7) S(E) = T and S(T) = E. Each object of V2 gives one or two positions of the permutation S.
5. An analysis of the vector V1
• The program analyzes objects of the vector V1 and reconstructs the permutation S. The permutation S certainly transforms a recurrent letter c into one of the letters of a string s1. An analyzed object allows us to reconstruct the permutation S only if positions of this permutation were reconstructed in advance for all the letters of a string s1 except for one letter (e.g., S(V) = Z, S(X) = −, S(Y) = −, S(Z) = Y and s1 = VXZ). Then S(c) = the only letter of s1 for which S is not defined. By "-" we denote no reconstructed positions of a permutation.
• The vector V1 is analyzed repeatedly. We end the analysis of V1 when the previous iteration did not give any new position of the permutation S. 
Correctness of the plugboard algorithm
We are interested in any established messages of the form (X
14
) that were generated for the same daily key settings (the choice and order of drums, ring settings, plug connections). For example
In
Hence, the permutation AD contains at least two 1-cycles.
A : (AP) (BJ) (CL) (DO) (EG) (FY) (HV) (IZ) (KM) (NT) (QS) (RW) (UX) D : (AX) (BU) (CO) (DZ) (EG) (FH) (IM) (JL) (KV) (NW) (PY) (QT) (RS) AD : (AYHKIDCJU) (BLOZMVFPX) (E) (G) (NQR) (STW)
Let us assume that we broke all elements of the daily key settings except the plugboard settings that are represented by a permutation S. In order to guess the plug connections, we shall replace the permutation S with the identity permutation H. Then, during ciphering, permutations A H , D H will be generated instead of permutations A and D (cf. (2), §6).
A H : (AU) (BJ) (CL) (DO) (EV) (FZ) (GT) (HN) (IP) (KQ) (MS) (RW) (XY) D H : (AI) (BP) (CO) (DY) (EM) (FH) (GT) (JL) (KN) (QX) (RS) (UZ) (VW) A H D H : (AZHKXDCJP) (BLOYQNFUI) (EWS) (G) (MRV) (T)
Let us consider any established message X 1 of the form (X
14
). Lemma 6.1 Let us assume that permutations A, D (generated for this message) contain the same transposition (k, x). Then, corresponding to them, permutations
It follows from the fact that the identity permutation H meets the assumptions of the permutation S (S consists of transpositions and 1-cycles only).
Let us consider two established messages X 1 and X 2 of the form (X
) with the same letter k. Let permutations A 1H , D 1H for message X 1 contain the identical transposition (k 1H , x 1H ) and permutations A 2H , D 2H for message X 2 contain transposition (k 2H , x 2H ). We know that k 1H = k 2H = S(k) (cf. lemma 6.1). 
)(E)(F)(Q)(S)(T)(V)(Z), //1-cycles of AH DH : (D)(E)(F)(M)(N)(S)(T)(Y)
Permutations A 1H , D 1H for message (6) contain the same transposition (G, T) and permutations A 2H , D 2H for message (7) contain the same transposition (N, T). Since the letter T occurs in both transpositions, we guess that k 1H = k 2H = T = S(k) = S(E). Therefore, S(E) = T and S(T) = E.
Implementation
The PlugBoard() method of the Enigma class generates a permutation S which represents plug connections according to the schema given in section 6.1. This method adds messages to the vector M, splits them into two vectors V1 and V2, and then reconstructs positions of the permutation S (by means of two methods GenerateS2() and GenerateS1()). The GenerateS2() method analyzes each element (an object of the 1cycle class) of V2 in order to reconstruct the permutation S. First, it checks whether S(c) is known or not. If S(c) = −, the method looks for a common letter in strings s1 and s2. The common letter is element k H , so S(c) = k H and S(k H ) = c. The GenerateS1() method checks whether a position S(c) is defined or not. If S(c) = −, the method checks if in a string s1 exists exactly one letter (e.g., A), for which S(A) is not defined. If such a letter exists, the permutation S is reconstructed as follows S(c) = A and S(A) = c. Otherwise, S is not reconstructed. The createAorD() method generates a permutation Λ (cf. the formula (1), §4) for the ring settings rs and for the drum settings dr. HE is an object of the Enigma class. The codeLetter() method ciphers a letter described by the first parameter for the rotor settings determined by the next three parameters. The moveD() method shifts drum settings dr for k presses of keys. By tpR we denote the turnover position for the right drum. The ITC() method changes a number from the set IP = {0, 1, . . . , 25} into a suitable letter. The CTI() method does the opposite operation. The Fem() method returns a string with 1-cycles of the permutation for which it was called.
( 1) void Plugs::PlugBoard(){ ( 2) Perm *A1, *D1, *AD, *S; 1cycle * 1c; ( 3) String c="", s1="", s2="", s=""; unsigned int i=0; ( 4) HE->readEnigma(); //add messages to the vector M 
How to transform messages
In order to reconstruct a permutation S, we can use messages (X
25
) and (X 36 ) in the same way. We can mix them, but if we analyze messages with the same letter k, we must take a couple of messages of the same form. If we have two messages with the same letter k and these messages are of different kinds (e.g., (X
14
) and (X 25 )), we can transform one of them into the other form.
Example 6.4 Let us consider the following message
PBT VAD CAG WPO makes up message settings for this message. After we shift PBT drum settings by one key press we get PBU drum settings. Let us set up drums to PBU (instead of PBT) and type two times message settings WPO (but shifted to the right by one letter i.e., POWPO? instead of WPOWPO). We obtain ADCAG? instead of VADCAG. We can see that double-ciphered message settings are also shifted to the right by one letter. Thus if we have two messages ICE AJA ADV PBT VAD CAG one of the form (X
14
) and the other of the form (X
25
) but both with the same letter k, we can transform one of them into the other form. We shall obtain ICE AJA ADV PBU ADC AG? Next, program will add both these messages to the vector V2. Certainly, we can transform messages of the form (X 36 ) in the same way.
Justification. Let us consider a message X 1 of the form (X
) i.e., αβγ x 1 kx 3 x 4 kx 6 , where α, β, γ, x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , x 6 , k belong to the set {A, B, . . . , Z}. Let us assume that K 1 K 2 K 3 makes up message settings of this message; i.e.,
Let us press any key before coding and begin ciphering with the second letter.
B(K
We obtained kx 3 x 4 kx 6 ? for drum settings shifted by one key press.
Reconstruction of the cryptologic bomb method

Historical specification of the bomb method
Rejewski's bomb method was used to break the daily key settings of messages transmitted after September 15, 1938 . This semiautomatic device consisted of three couples of the M3 Enigma machines in which rotors were propelled by an electric motor. Each couple of machines analyzed one message of the form (X 
). Additionally, all three messages had to contain the same recurrent letter k (in doubleciphered message settings). For each couple of machines, drums of the first Enigma were shifted on the basis of initial drum settings (divergent information cf. [8, 9, 10] ). Drums of the second Enigma were shifted by pressing three keys in relation to drums of the first Enigma (cf. [9] ). Next, the bomb was activated. The machine stopped when each couple of Enigmas reached a common code of recurrent letter k (different for each couple). Then, cryptologists read ring settings and activated the bomb again. The bomb usually stopped a few times only (0, 1, 2, or 3) . Next, all of the • For each couple of machines, shift the drums of the first Enigma (on the basis of initial drum settings) to obtain a code of recurrent letter k by means of a permutation A.
• For each couple of machines, shift the drums of the second Enigma by pressing three keys in relation to the drums of the first Enigma (i.e., the second Enigma codes a letter k by means of a permutation D).
4.
By means of the instruction while test all possible ring settings and for each of them determine codes of recurrent letter k (e.g., for k = A). Write down the ring settings (0, 1, 2 or 3 possibilities) for which codes of recurrent letter are identical (different for each couple). Check these possibilities and simultaneously guess the plugboard settings. You can use the plugboard algorithm from section 6.
Example 7.2 Let us consider three messages
We reveal that, these messages were generated for ring settings Rs = EHM, for drums I, II, III and for the plugboard connections S = (ET)(IX)(MQ)(NV)(PU)(YZ).
Executing the bomb algorithm:
3. We show how the program will analyze messages for the order of drums I, II, III.
• Set ring settings to Rs = ZZZ.
• Set up drums of 6 machines in the following way. E 11 : CPV, E 12 : CQY (drums of E 12 are shifted by 3 key presses in relation to drums of E 11 ) E 21 : EQE, E 22 : EQH (drums of E 21 are shifted by 2 key presses in relation to initial drum settings EQC) E 31 : FQN, E 32 : FQQ (drums of E 31 are shifted by 1 key press in relation to initial drum settings FQM)
4. The program returns two results Rs = EHM and Rs = UDW.
• Check whether EHM makes up ring settings or not, i.e., set up drums in the order L = I, M = II, R = III, set rings to EHM and execute the plugboard algorithm. The program will return the following permutation S. ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ S ABCDTFGHXJKLQVOUMRSEPNWIZY • Set up plugboard according to the permutation S, set drums to CPV and type double-ciphered message settings ADCAYL. Enigma will return a text RTY(RTY). Thus, EHM ring settings are proper.
• If you execute the plugboard algorithm for UDW ring settings, you will not get permutation S, because inside the plugBoard() method (cf. §6.3) there is the readEnigma() method, which reads ring settings.
Implementation of the algorithm
The Rings() method of the Bomb class generates potential ring settings for the current order of drums and three messages of the form (X 14 ) (or (X
25
) or (X 36 )). In the beginning, 6 Enigmas are adjusted; i.e., for all machines rings are set to ZZZ and drums are set up according to three-letter strings remembered in a table BE. By means of a loop while all possibilities of ring settings are tested (17,576 possibilities). First, each Enigma determines a code of a recurrent letter k by means of the codeNext() method. If codes of this letter for each couple of Enigmas are the same, the Rings() method writes down potential ring settings. Next, by means of the moveR() method, the next ring settings are established for all Enigma machines. Let us notice that, according to the specification of the M3 Enigma machine, the codeNext() method first shifts drums, next calculates rotor settings and finally codes a sign. The moveD() method is defined in section 6.3.
( 1) void Bomb::Rings(String *BE, char c){ ( 2) char c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6; int i=0; String s; ( 3) E11->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [1] ); E12->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [2] ); E21->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [3] ); ( 4) E22->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [4] ); E31->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [5] ); E32->setEnigma("ZZZ",BE [6] ); ( 5) 
Computational complexity
The total running time of the Rings() method for the established order of drums, by using a computer with an AMD Turion 64 X2 processor clocked at 1.9GHz, is about 5 seconds. The coding of letters (which is called 6 times for each of the 17576 ring settings) is the most time-consuming operation within this method. We have to repeat the method 6 times (i.e., for each possible order of 3 drums). The Rings() method returns several (0, 1, 2 or 3) ring settings. To guess which result is correct, we can call the PlugBoard() method for each of the listed ring settings. This method produces a result immediately (in a fraction of a second). Thus, we get a proper daily key (for 3 drums) after about 30 seconds. The cryptologists used 6 crypto bombs (one bomb for each order of drums), which were activated simultaneously. They obtained the result after about 2 hours. When the German service added two additional drums, cryptologists needed 60 bombs. The running time of the Rings() method for 5 drums is about 300 seconds. We can see that a computer program gives a quicker result. H. Zygalski designed a better and cheaper method -perforated sheets. This method is completely independent from plug connections. An implementation of Zygalski's method is presented in full in [2] .
The implications of the work and conclusions
We can solve the Enigma cipher (by analyzing and completing historic information) because trained Polish and (later) British cryptologists did it earlier. The Enigma cipher is not trivial and its breaking on the basis of eavesdropped messages (without the help of spies, mistakes of operators and numerous favorable coincidences) is practically impossible even nowadays. Zygalski's sheets method is more complicated but effective in each case. The reader can find the full algorithm in [2] . Both of these methods are interesting exercises and encourage the study of current problems of cryptology. If the reader has the required skills, one can try to build his own electronic variant of the Enigma-E machine.
Let us assume that we know the decryption method and we have a computer and then a cryptologist introduces a change. We can guess that this change can thwart all work of crypto analyzers. We can notice that breaking an Enigma key takes time, even today. Decryption algorithms always have huge computational complexity. The interesting history of the Enigma machine confirms the fact that cryptology will always be of great (commercial, diplomatic, and military) importance.
of three rotating, encrypting discs (called drums) placed on a shared shaft, two fixed wheels: an entry wheel and a reflector, a battery and a turning mechanism (used to turn one, two or three drums after pressing any key). Figure 1 presents a simplified diagram of how the Enigma works (a hypothetical electric circuit). Pressing any key (e.g., the key W) makes the closure of an electric circuit. After that, the current flows through the different components in the present configuration of the circuit. It starts from the battery (3) and flows through a connection under the pressed key (2) to the plugboard (1). Next, it flows through the entry wheel (E), via three drums (R, M and L) to the reflector (B). The reflector inverts the signal (but using a completely different route). From the reflector, the current passes through drums L, M and R to the entry wheel (E), to the plugboard (1) and finally to an appropriate lamp (4) (which represents a letter different from W), causing it to light up (cf. [9] ). The German Land Forces and Air Force used five kinds of drums denoted by I, II, III, IV, V. Each drum is a disc with a diameter of approximately 10cm. Inside the drum, there is a second disc (called a rotor ). On one side of each rotor, there are 26 brass spring pins, and on the other side, there are 26 flat electrical contacts. Both pins and contacts are arranged in a circle near the edge of the rotor and represent 26 letters of the alphabet. Each rotor hides 26 insulated wires. The wires connect the pins on one side to the contacts on the other in an established way (different for each type of drum) (cf. [10, 8] ). As the drums are mounted side-by-side on the shaft, the pins of one drum touch the contacts of the neighboring one, forming 26 fragments of an electrical circuit (cf. [10] ). Each drum has a metal rotating ring applied to the rotor. Engraved numbers (on this ring) correspond to the 26 letters of the alphabet. On the edge of the rotor, there is one distinguished place. The letter on the ring which is engraved opposite this position is treated as the ring setting. Individual kinds of cipher drums also differ by the so-called turnover positions. The turnover positions of the five kinds of drums were as follows I -Q, II -E, III -V, IV -J, V -Z (cf. [8] ).
Pressing any key causes additionally one, two, or three cipher drums to turn one twenty-sixth of a full rotation (before the electrical circuit closure). More precisely, after pressing the key, the right drum turns 1/26 of a full rotation. When this drum reaches the turnover position, the middle drum turns 1/26 of a full rotation as well. When the second drum reaches the turnover position, the left and middle drums turn 1/26 of a full rotation (so-called "double step") (cf. [7, 10] ). In this way, each letter is coded with the drums in different positions.
The position of each movable drum is given as a number (engraved on a ring) which can be seen through a window in the lid of the machine. The rotor position is defined as the difference between the position of the drum and the ring setting.
Connections of the entry wheel in the M3 Enigma machine are represented by the identity permutation (cf. [8] ). The reflector (reversal drum) pairs the outputs of the last rotor, redirecting the current back through the drums using a different path.
In order to decode a text encrypted with the M3 Enigma machine, the receiver had to set up his Enigma in the same way as the sender had set up his during ciphering. Each military unit that used the Enigma was provided with the Enigma machine's initial settings in the form of tables of the daily key settings. Daily key settings (since September 15, 1938) consisted of the wheel order (i.e., the choice of drums and the order in which they were fitted), the ring settings and connections of the plugboard (cf. [7] ). Since September 15, 1938 Enigma machine construction as well as designing new ways of breaking daily keys. They gave the results of their work to the chiefs of Cipher Bureau, who decided on the importance and the order of reading messages. Since the Enigma ciphers a text by means of involutions, in order to decode a message, decoders had to set up their Enigma in the same way as the sender had set up his while ciphering. Messages were read by initiated operators. To that end, the AVA factory made 17 Enigma doubles in the years 1933-1939. In 1938, an experiment was carried out. Its result was that a 10-person team (consisting of cryptologists and operators) of the B.S.-4 read 75% of intercepted Enigma messages. On September 15, 1938, German cryptologists changed the manner of announcing message settings. The decryption method (based on characteristics catalogues) became useless. In October 1938, M. Rejewski designed the cryptologic bomb method. The bombs returned a result within 2 hours. Coders activated 6 machines simultaneously (one bomb for each order of 3 drums). On December 15, 1938, the German service increased the number of drums from 3 to 5. That is, in the machine there were still only three drums on the shaft, but from then on the three were chosen from a set of five. M. Rejewski quickly discovered the connections of two new drums. Breaking daily keys by means of the bomb method was no longer effective, as operators needed 60 bombs instead of 6. On January 1, 1939, the German service increased the number of pairs of letters changed by the plugboard. From then on, they applied from 7 to 10 connections. As Rejewski constructed the crypto bomb, at the same time, another decryption method (Zygalski's sheets method) was designed in the B.S.-4. The cryptologists needed to make 6 sets of perforated sheets (one set for each order of 3 drums). Each set consisted of 26 sheets. They had to cut out (with a razor blade) about a thousand perforations in each sheet of paper. They only made 2 of 6 sets because of the lack of initiated staff. In July 1939, Polish cryptologists met British and French cryptologists. Poles revealed all of their knowledge and abilities to read Enigma. After the outbreak of WWII (September 1, 1939) , some of the staff of the Cipher Bureau were evacuated to Romania and then to France. The French-Polish radio-intelligence unit "Bruno" (about 70 people) was stationed about 40 kilometers from Paris. All materials, equipment, and machines (with the exception of two Enigmas) had been destroyed before leaving Poland. The British provided the unit with the whole collection of 60 sets of 26 perforated Zygalski sheets (for 5 drums). Since the British Cipher Bureau had more resources at that time, out of every 100 keys that were recovered, 83 came from the British and 17 came from the Poles. In May 1940, German cryptologists again radically changed the mechanism of using Enigma. French general G. Bertrand wrote: Superhuman efforts and incessant work day and night were needed in order to overcome this new obstacle: on 20 May [thanks to Polish cryptologists] decryption was restarted (cf. [8] ). In June 1940 France signed a truce with Germany. On 24 June, the staff of "Bruno" (15 Poles and 7 Spaniards) were transported to Algeria. From Africa, the cryptologists returned to France where, in October 1940, they began work in the unit "Cadix" (32 employees), which stayed in contact with London. There, Polish cryptologists solved ciphers different from the Enigma cipher. The British cryptologists dealt with Enigma.
